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I.

Introduction
Mass torts have becomemoved center stage in the courts, the academy, and the
popular press. The plight of mass tort victims—asbestos victims, Dalkon shield
users, breast implant recipients, among others—has become standard fare in the
media., and cCourts and commentators have struggled for several decades
attempting to craft just and workable solutionsresolutions of mass tort liabilities.
The challenge is to save the business, restructuring its debts, while providing fair
treatment to future claimants and achieving a final resolution of their rights
against the business.
A "mass tort" problem arises when a company’s product has been mass produced
and widely distributed before the nature or extent of its harm-generating potential
becomes evident. By the time the potential for harm is realized, large numbers of
individuals have already been placed at risk through contact or exposure to the
product. Many of these at-risk individuals will ultimately will suffer harm from
this contact with the product and will look to the manufacturer for redress.1 The
magnitude of the potential liability may cause the manufacturer’s demise.
Bankruptcy reorganization has emerged as one legal avenue to for resolving mass
tort liability.2 The challenge is to save the business, by restructuring its debts,

while providing fair treatment to future tort victims—"future claimants"—and
achieving a final resolution of their rights against the business.3 Bankruptcy
reorganization results in financial and perhaps economic restructuring of the
debtor’s business. Parties in interest negotiate over the fate of the business and the
distribution of value among claimants.
At the center of this bankruptcy approach to mass tort resolution is the idea of the
future claims representative (the "FCR"), a court-appointed agent named to
represent then-nameless, faceless future victims of claimed tortious acts already
committed by the corporate debtor. The FCR’s mandate is to negotiate on behalf
of future claimants, asserting their rights as creditors to their pro rata share of
value in the reorganized company. This representational device makes possible
the crafting of a comprehensive settlement in bankruptcy, one that includes future
claimants and disposes of their rights, along with those of other claimants. The
FCR device makes possible a sort of constructive participation by future
claimants. Theyclaimants, so that they may be bound to any resulting settlement.
While other aspects of the bankruptcy model have been vetted,4 thisthe FCR
device has not received the careful scrutiny it deserves. The FCR is in essence an
agent without a principal. She is not answerable to her ostensible beneficiaries.
Indeed, the absence of the principal is the very circumstance requiring the
invention of the device. Given the pressure on bankruptcy claimants to settle, to
come to terms so that the debtor may reorganize, standard agency theory
mightand insights from social psychology may lead us to view the FCR device
with some skepticism. One might understandably question whether this
mechanism can be expected truly to provide zealous representation for future
claimants, who do not choose and cannot monitor their agent. Moreover, their
losses are not "vivid" but abstract and prospective,5 while the losses of competing
claimants are real. While thereAll agency relationships entail costs.6 But the FCR
mechanism is particularly problematic insofar as the principals may have
enormous individual and collective stakes in the subject of the agency but a
complete inability to assure the faithfulness of their agent.
The outcomes in several mass tort bankruptcies have received mixed reviews or
worse with respect to future claimants’ treatment and their ultimate recoveries.7
Assessing outcomes is no doubt a complicated affair, and multipleaffair. Multiple
plausible explanations exist for both negotiated and litigated decisionsoutcomes
that in retrospect appear to have prejudiced future claimants’ interests. This
context suggests that anAn examination of the FCR mechanism is therefore
timely.
This Article takes a preliminary step in the investigation. The bankruptcy model
of mass tort resolution is still something of a moving target, and the handful of
mass tort bankruptcies that have occurred provide only a small data set. In this
Article, , I sketch the contours of the agency problem. I describe the bankruptcy
model, explaining how, where and why the agent might be tempted to shirk. I

raise a cautionary flag, suggesting lines of inquiry, hoping to sharpen the focus on
issues of concern.concern.
In Part II, I describe the bankruptcy model of mass tort resolution and the FCR’s
central role. In Part III, Iprovide an agency critiqueof the FCR
mechanismmechanism. I identify influences that might distract the FCR from the
goal of maximizing future claimants’ recoveries in bankruptcy. In Part IV, I
suggest further avenues of inquiry and conclude.e.
II.

The Bankruptcy Model of Mass Tort Resolution
TheConceptually, the bankruptcy model forapproach to resolution of mass torts is
conceptually no different from bankruptcy reorganization in other
contexts.comports with the general model of bankruptcy reorganization. Creditors
negotiate with the debtor over the remaking of the firm, with a confirmed plan
detailingfirm. A court-approved plan of reorganization details the structure of the
reorganized entity and each creditor’s share in the value of that entity. However,
the contingent nature of future claimants’ rights, their temporal dispersion, and
inability to represent themselves make the standard bankruptcy model an uneasy
fit. Future claimants cannot participate directly in the multilateral negotiation
central to the Chapter 11 process. They cannot strategize and bluster in the hope
of attaining a larger share of the fixed pie. They cannot claim their distributions
upon plan confirmation, as do other creditors. To address these discontinuities,
creative lawyers and judges devised mechanisms to allowenable the mass tort
problem to be massaged into the bankruptcy mold.
However, the fit is not perfect. The mechanisms that enable future claimants’
nominal participation in Chapter 11 have a fair bit of play in them. Whether that
play works to the benefit or detriment of future claimants depends critically on the
quality and zealousness of their representation. This Part describes the bankruptcy
model, its mechanisms for inclusion of future claims, and the FCR’s critical role.
A.

Bankruptcy Reorganization
In bankruptcy reorganization, negotiation among the debtor and its
creditors decides the fate of the business and the division of value among
claimants. The product that emerges from this negotiation is a plan of
reorganization, the blueprint for the debtor’s restructuring. The plan
adjusts the rights and obligations among the debtor and its creditors and
equity holders. It may specify reduction of the interest rate or extension of
the maturity of certain debt obligations. It may call for payment of some
debts at a discount from their prepetition face amount. It may specify
reduction of the interest rate or extension of the maturity of certain debt
obligations. It may call for satisfaction of other debt obligations with the
issuance of new equity by the reorganized entity. The plan may also
specify operational changes. For instance, the debtor may be required to

sell unprofitable lines of business or consolidate certain operations. The
ultimate goal of this financial and operational restructuring is to assure
that the business that emerges from bankruptcy will be economically
viable. Upon finding that a proposed plan meets all the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code, a court will confirm the plan, which then binds the
debtor and all claimants.8
Because of the sheer number of claimants that may be involved in a
reorganization and the relative inability of small claimants to participate in
a cost-effective manner, unsecured creditors ordinarily negotiate through
official representatives in the large cases.9 The Bankruptcy Code10
provides for the appointment of an official committee of Code contains
few substantive requirements for any unsecured creditors,11 which
ordinarily will comprise the debtor’s seven largest unsecured creditors
willing to serve.12 The committee is entitled to retain attorneys and other
professionals,13 who are compensated—as are the debtor’s professionals—
from the bankruptcy estate.14 The Code further contemplates that
additional committees may be fashioned, to the extent necessary to assure
adequate representation of creditors or equity holders.15 Official
committees and their counsel generally play significant roles in
bankruptcy reorganization.
The Bankruptcy Code contains few substantive requirements for any
reorganization plan.16 Instead, it provides a framework for multilateral
bargaining. Negotiation over the division of value among claimants
occurs, however, in the shadow of two fundamental distributional norms:
absolute priority and equal treatment. Under the rule of absolute priority, a
class of unsecured claims or interests is not entitled to any bankruptcy
distribution unless and until each senior class either consents or is paid in
full.17 The rule of equal treatment requires that similarly situated creditors
receive equality of treatment.: "Equality of distribution among creditors is
a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code. According to that policy,
creditors of equal priority should receive pro rata shares of the debtor’s
property."18 These distributional norms, however, provide only the starting
point for negotiation. The parties are free to—and generally do—agree to
diverge from these norms. What any party ultimately receives in under a
plan reorganization depends to a great extent on its negotiating skill and its
ability to use its leverage under the Chapter 11 framework.
Creditor leverage in negotiation derives in large measure from creditor
consent requirements for plan confirmation.19 Creditors vote by class.
Their claims are classified under the plan, with only "substantially similar"
claims allowed in the same class.20 Classes whose rights are impaired
under the plan are entitled to vote.21 Ordinarily, all impaired classes must
approve a plan in order for it to be confirmed.22 If an impaired class of
unsecured creditors disapproves a plan, then the plan may be confirmed

only if no class junior to thethat objecting class receives any distribution in
bankruptcy.23 In other words, creditor classes are entitled to insist on
absolute priority in the bankruptcy distribution.
While this substantive rule of absolute priority tends to favors senior
creditors, other aspects of the negotiation framework favor junior
claimants. The debtor’s management typically controls the negotiating
agenda, since it initially enjoys "exclusivity"—the exclusive privilege of
proposing a plan to the court.24 In large public company reorganizations,
the debtor will ordinarily also retain exclusivity for the duration of the
case.25 Because the debtor’s management typically aligns with equity
holders or junior creditors,26 management will often use its agenda control
to favor junior claimants, attempting to extract value from senior classes in
favor of junior classes. Senior classes can either hold out—insistinghold
out, insisting on a better proposal from the debtor—or attemptdebtor while
threatening—or actually attempting—to wrest control of the case from the
debtor. They may move to have the debtor’s exclusivity terminated in
order to propose their own plans.27 Or they may move for the debtor’s
liquidation or dismissal of the case.28
The doomsday scenario for all parties—assuming there is going concern
surplus—occurs when deadlock over the division of the surplusvalue
results in the demise of the business and the debtor’s piecemeal
liquidation. This possibility of mutually assured destruction always lurks
in the background, and collective avoidance of this worst case scenario is
a primary goal of reorganization.29 But the splitting of the fixed—and
perhaps shrinking—pie depends to a great extent on each party’s
negotiating leverage, which turns in no small part on that party’s
willingness to threaten and perhaps force a piecemeal liquidation if its
demands are not met.30 As Professors Elizabeth Warren and Jay
Westbrook have so aptly noted: "We can think of a Chapter 11 negotiation
as taking place in a conference room with the debtor sitting in the window
threatening to jump . . . while the creditors threaten to push."31
As a practical matter, reorganization of large firms is typically consensual.
All impaired classes ultimately vote in favor of a plan proposed by the
debtor.32 Senior classes agree to forego strict absolute priority, giving up
value to junior claimants in order to achieve consensus.33
This result, however, typically does not occur without significant
skirmishing among the debtor and creditor factions.
B.

The Mass Tort Debtor

Unlike most firms in bankruptcy, the mass tort debtor does not necessarily
suffer current cash flow problems. It may be able to meet its current
expenses.34 However, it has a different problem.
Modern manufacturing and distribution enable widespread sale and use of
a product long before its harm-generating potential becomes evident to the
public.35 The harm involved may also have a "long tail"—that is, the harm
may not manifest for years or even decades after sale of the product to end
users. The latency period for asbestos-related disease, for example, may
run as long as forty years.36 And the liability will not all mature at once,
but progressively over time. In addition, the severity of the individual
harms that ultimately manifest will vary depending on individual
circumstances. While it is impossible to pinpoint how much time or how
much liability, it becomes clear at a certain point that the aggregate
liability will eventually will be staggering, and the manufacturer’s survival
is will be in doubt. This staggering liability, along with the sheer number
of future victims and the temporal dispersion and varying severity of their
future harms, are the hallmarks of the mass tort case.37 These features
make difficult the structuring of any final resolution of this future claims
liability.
But without some comprehensive resolution, the firm faces a slow death,
as future liabilities mature over time, punctuated by the firm’s operational
collapse.38 As the cloud of future liability becomes darker and darker,
financing becomes more and more difficult to obtain. Doubts about the
continuing viability of the business grow. Customers and suppliers defect.
Financing becomes be more and more difficult to obtain. The business
gradually grinds to a halt.39
Rather than wait for this slow death to overtake the business, the firm
actively seeks a global solution to the overhanging future liabilities.
Bankruptcy is an attractive option, provided that future claimants’ rights
may be adjudicated in bankruptcy. Asbestos, Dalkon shields, and silicone
breast implants40—among others—have generated long-tail tort liability
sufficient to force their manufacturers into bankruptcy.
C.

An Uneasy Fit
Future claims in mass tort cases present conceptual and practical problems
for the bankruptcy process. Conceptually, future claims are meant to be
treated just like other unsecured claims against the debtor in bankruptcy.41
They are meant to receive some distribution in bankruptcy in final
settlement of their rights against the reorganizing firm. However, future
claims do not easily fit into the multiparty bargaining regime for corporate
reorganization.

1.

Future Claimants’ Participation
The first and most critical problem is the inability of future
claimants to participate and protect their interests in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Because their injuries have not manifested by the time
of bankruptcy, future claimants may be impossible to identify or
even describe except in general terms.42 Some may not even have
been born at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Even identified,
many may not come forward to participate in a proceeding whose
potential effect on them is remote. It may be difficult to convince a
potential future tort victim to invest resources today in a
proceeding that will affect her, if ever, only years into the
futurefuture.
Whether any type of notice would be meaningful in this situation is
questionable.43 If only a remote possibility of future injury exists
for any given individual, then even personal notice of the
bankruptcy may not be sufficient to satisfy constitutional due
process requirements. The Supreme Court has noted in the class
action context:
Many persons . . . may not even know of their exposure, or realize
the extent of the harm they may incur. Even if they fully appreciate
the significance of class notice, those without current afflictions
may not have the information or foresight needed to decide,
intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out. . . .[W]e recognize the
gravity of the question whether class action notice sufficient under
the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so
unselfconscious and amorphous.44
As a practical matter, then, the future claimant may have had no
opportunity to assert her rights in bankruptcy. Foreclosing the
rights of a creditor under these circumstances would raise serious
due process concerns.
Providing due process—including adequate representation—for
future claimants, however, may be critical to all parties with a
stake in reorganization. From future claimants’ perspective, as with
other creditors, their rights and opportunities for recovery may be
affected by the proceeding. In addition, future claimants as a group
also have a special interest in the long-term viability of the
business. Given the staggering amount of aggregate future claims
liability that drives the debtor into bankruptcy, future claimants
will likely be the dominant creditor group—at least in terms of
their share of the debtor’s overall liabilities. They may therefore be
entitled to the lion’s share of value in the reorganized debtor. They

may have a legitimate claim to majority ownership of the
reorganized firm.45 Future claimants as a group will therefore be
vitally interested in the viability of the reorganized entity. They
will be concerned that the operational and financial restructuring
meant to occur in bankruptcy will be successful.
Other parties in interest also have a stake in assuring that due
process is accorded to future claimants. A failure of due process
would preclude the bankruptcy from affecting future claimants’
legal rights. That of course would frustrate the primary purpose of
the bankruptcy filing—to achieve a comprehensive and final
settlement of all future claims liability.
2.

Other Problems
Even assuming that due process protections for future claimants
could be engineered, future claims raise other problems for
bankruptcy reorganization. Future claims liability is by definition
contingent. Its temporal dispersion makes its aggregate amount
difficult to quantify in advance. Therefore, it is difficult to
determine what future claimants’ proportionate share of the
reorganized debtor’s value should be. Even if this aggregate figure
could reliably be determined, the subsequent delivery of individual
compensation presents problems. How can individual bankruptcy
distributions be made to unknowns whose respectivewho will
suffer injuries that will individually manifest for decades into the
future? How will each future claim be liquidated when it matures?
Once liquidated, where shall the future claimant—now injured—
turn to collect her promised compensation?

D.

Conceptual Bankruptcy Prescription
By fits and starts, lawyers and courts improvised solutions to these issues
as they arose. Today, we can speak of a "traditional" approach.46 To
borrow Peter Schuck’s phrase, an "institutional evolution" has occurred in
the bankruptcy model of mass tort management.47 To enable future
claimants to participate in the plan negotiation process and other aspects
of the bankruptcy proceeding, a special legal representative for future
claimants—the FCR—is appointed.48 Complex estimation proceedings are
conducted in order to value future claims, thereby fixing the
manufacturer’s aggregate liability and ascertaining future claimants’
collective share of value in the reorganized debtor.49 That share of value is
paid to future claimants in trust. A trust is created to hold and husband the
assets set aside for future claimants.50 A claims resolution facility is
structured to streamline claims liquidation and disburse payments as future
claims mature.51 A "channeling injunction" enjoins future claimants from

pursuing the reorganized debtor or any successor to the debtor’s business
or assets. Future claims are instead channeled to the designated payment
trust, and the going concern is insulated from postbankruptcy suit by
future claimants.52
These improvisations received limited after-the-fact approval by Congress
in 1994 with its adoption of the so-called Manville Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code,53 named after the case that pioneered the basic structure
of the traditional approach. With the Manville Amendments, Congress
affirmed the practice of enjoining future claimants’ pursuit of the
reorganized debtor or certain third parties after plan confirmation,
provided that certain provisions had been made for future claimants in the
case—for example, appointment of a FCR54 and establishment of a
payment trust.55 This Congressional blessing was specifically limited to
asbestos cases.56
More recently, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission has
recommended legislation adopting a similar approach, which would apply
not only to asbestos cases but would be available in all mass future claims
liability situations.57
E.

Play in the Joints
This now-traditional approach to mass tort reorganization seems both
elegant and straightforward conceptually. Ingenious devices are employed
to bring future claimants into the bankruptcy process, enabling vindication
of their rights as creditors while saving the business for the benefit of all
parties in interest. Hidden in the details, however, are numerous issues
affecting the fortunes of future claimants and others. There is play in the
joints of this mass tort reorganization process. Whether future claimants or
other competing claimants benefit from that play Quite of bit of slack lies
buried in the system. How much of that slack gets taken up for the benefit
or detriment of future claimants or other parties will depend in large
partmeasure on the negotiating skills of their respective agents.
For instance, the process of estimating aggregate future claims liability is
critical to determining the entitlement of future claimants—and other
creditors—to their pro rata share of the value of the reorganized debtor.
This process is basically a battle among competing experts, turning largely
on statistical analysis based on various assumptions. If the assumptions are
wrong, future claimants may suffer.58 The Manville Trust ran out of assets
after less than two years in operation and had to be restructured over six
years of litigation.59 Originally intended to pay all future claimants in
full,60 the restructured trust will pay only pro rata amounts, with an initial
pro rata payment of 10%. 61 During the course of Manville’s bankruptcy,
the estimated total number of claims was revised upward several times. By

the time of plan confirmation, the funding of the trust was based on an
assumption of 100,000 claims at a present value of $25,000 each.62
However, "[c]ircumstances quickly outstripped projections concerning the
number of claims, the rate at which they were filed and their average
value."63
Given the uneasy mix of science and law, the range of expert estimates
presented during the claim estimation process may be fairly broad. In A.H.
Robins, five experts gave estimates of aggregate unliquidated Dalkon
Shield claims liability ranging from $800 million to $7 billion,64 a
difference of 875% between the low and high estimates.
Now, the claim estimation mechanism in bankruptcy is not unique to mass
tort cases. Bankruptcy courts resort to claim estimation whenever the
ordinary course liquidation of a contingent or unliquidated claim would
unduly delay administration of the case.65 However, several aspects of
mass tort cases make estimation especially tricky. Given the potential
magnitude of the liability, the outcome may determine the proportionate
shares of ownership of the reorganized debtor.66 In addition, the number of
individual claims and their temporal dispersion make estimation fairly
speculative. In the face of these daunting factors, the court in Dow
Corning basically refused to take on the task or even to establish
estimation procedures.67 Instead, the court left the entire fair distribution
issue for the parties to negotiate.68 Given this context, zealous
representation and expert advicetherefore seem imperative on all sides in
order to assure that estimation doesestimation—whether court-conducted
or informally negotiated—does not work to the prejudice of particular
claimants.69
The structuring of a payment mechanism—a claims resolution facility and
payment trust—is also no easy matter.70 Different structures may tend to
favor some interests over others. For example, at one point in the Robins
bankruptcy, it was proposed that any money left in the Dalkon Shield
claimants’ trust after all claims had been paid would revert to reorganized
Robins.71 That arrangement, of course, would have given the company
incentive to push for a claim resolution structure and administration that
would minimize payments to tort victims.72
Some structures may favor early maturing future claims over later
maturing ones or vice versa. There may be pressure to "lowball" early
claims in order to preserve enough assets to pay later claims. While
distributing assets fairly among future claimants is certainly a laudable
goal,worthy end, there may be other motivations at work as well. For
example, if the claim estimation process in a given case were controversial
and the court’s ultimate estimate of aggregate mass tort liability debatable,
parties in interest or the court might care about legitimating the outcome

after the fact. One way to do that is to make sure the trust still has assets
on the day the last future claim has been paid off.73 If this happens, then
arguably the court’s estimate was "correct" and the bankruptcy process
was fair to future claimants.claimants. This scenario is not merely
hypothetical. The A.H. Robins court specifically retained postconfirmation
jurisdiction to supervise the Dalkon Shield Claimants’ Trust in order to
"assure the accuracy of the Court’s estimate."74
Because of the play in the joints of the traditional model for mass tort
bankruptcy, the FCR’s role is critical. The quality and zeal of her
representation determine the likelihood and amount of future claimants’
recoveries. As important, because of the aggregate amount of claims she
represents, she wields a heavy club. Given the dollar value of their claims
in the mass tort context, future claimants are likely to be a major—and
perhaps dominant—creditor group.75 The FCR is potentially a major voice
in the reorganization process, with potential leverage either to assure
future claimants’ future compensation or to scuttle a deal not to her liking.
This critical role requires a careful look at the terms of the FCR’s agency.
III.

The Future Claims Representative as Agent
The FCR device enables future claimants to participate in mass tort
reorganization, asserting their rights as creditors through their representative.
Bankruptcy’s binding effect on future claimants depends on this constructive
participation. However, severe agency problems exist with the FCR mechanism.
The fundamental fundamental—and unavoidable problem is that the purported
principals play no part in choosing or monitoring their agent or even in deciding
whether to retain one at all. Instead, other parties in interest—the debtor and other
creditors—initiate the process, and the judge decides whether and whom to
appoint,76 as well as the terms of the agency. All these actors have interests that
will conflict with those of future claimants.
Ultimately, the FCR mechanism may not assure zealous representation of future
claimants’ interests. The appointment process, judicial oversight of the FCR, and
group pressure may discourage a FCR’s zealous pursuit of future claimants’
interests. The FCR has principals only as a conceptual matter. The terms and
quality of the FCR’s representation are not subject to oversight by her ostensible
"clients." A significant potential exists, therefore, for divergence between the
respective interests of principal and agent.
This Part first describes standarddiscusses agency problems with the FCR device.
It then discusses thedescribes an institutional context that may inhibit the FCR’s
zealous advocacy for future claimants. In particular, the influence of the judge,
the other lawyers involved in the mass tort case,appointment process, judicial
oversight of the FCR, and the culture of consensual reorganization may

causetogether discourage a FCR’s zealous pursuit of the FCR to compromise
future claimants’ interests.
A.

Seeking an Agent
Before establishing a principal-agent arrangement, the principal must first
decide whether to rely on an agent at all. An agent’s interests will never
perfectly coincide with those of her principal. The agent will always have
some incentive either to shirk or to pursue her own interests instead of
those of her principal. Despite this inevitable divergence of interests,
relying on agents still makes sense in many contexts.77 A principal will
rely onretain an agent as long as the costs of doing so are less than the
costs to the principal of acting on her own behalf. These latter costs
include the principal’s opportunity costs and the costs of developing any
specialized skill or expertise she may need to accomplish her end. For
example, a client may seek out legal representation even knowing that no
attorney will advocate her position as zealously as she herself
wouldherself would. It will typically be cheaper for the client to buy the
lawyer’s expertise—even discounted for the imperfections of the
agency—than for the client to develop the skill set necessary to represent
herself effectively.78
Future claimants, of course, typically have little choice in this regard.
They do not initiate appointment of a FCR. They may not even know of
their stake in the bankruptcy. Even with full information concerning her
risk of future harm and the possibility that the bankruptcy proceeding will
affect her rights, a future claimant may rationally choose not to participate,
either personally or through an agent. She runs only a risk of future harm,
while the costs of her participation would be a certainty.79 The expected
value of participating would likely be negative.80
TheUnfortunately, the appointment of the FCR willtypically occur at the
instigation not of any ostensible principal, but at the behest of the debtor
and other represented parties. Their purpose is to improve their own
returns in bankruptcy by arranging a comprehensive settlement of future
claims liability. This suggests the result-oriented nature of the FCR
mechanism. It is a device to protect the rightsrepresent the interests of
future claimants, but not in all bankruptcies, and not even in all mass tort
bankruptcies, but only in those cases in which other parties have an
interest in securing representation for future claimants. The FCR’s agency
is an atypical one in this respect. Not only is she not selected by her
ostensible principals, but the principals do not seek out the agency
relationship. The principals have no say in the retention of the agent at all.
Instead, appointment occurs at the behest of parties that are already
represented in the case.81

This prompts several observations.
1.

Underinclusiveness of the FCR Mechanism
As a group, future claimants are generally better off having their
rights recognized and settled in bankruptcy. Absent a
comprehensive settlement, the business would likely fail
eventually,82 and future claimants with late-maturing claims would
have no avenue of recovery when their respective claims
matured.83 In this respect, the FCR mechanism benefits the group
of future claimants by overcoming a collective action problem
among them,84 much like the class action mechanism.85
However, because future claimants cannot ordinarily initiate
appointment of a FCR, they must rely on other parties to do it. And
those other parties will have interests opposed to those of future
claimants. The impetus to recognizing and settling future
claimants’ rights is not simply some abstract desire to do justice or
treat future tort victims fairly. Instead, it derives from the
recognition by other parties in interest that they have something to
gain from resolving future claims liability in bankruptcy, and that
appointment of a FCR is necessary to that end. In particular,
parties decide that a reorganization of the business will maximize
returns to them, provided future claims liability can be resolved.86
And the parties conclude that only with representation may future
claimants’ rights be affected in bankruptcy.
Presumably in many cases whereIf the debtor’s business were to be
liquidated instead, there would typically be no incentive for other
parties in interest to include future claims in the bankruptcy
distribution, and therefore no incentive to provide for their
representation. In these cases, no FCR is appointed, and future
claims arewill be ignored in the bankruptcy. But if future claimants
are truly creditors with rights cognizable in bankruptcy, then they
deserve equal treatment with other unsecured creditors, whether
the debtor is liquidating or reorganizing.87 Representation may be
critical to assuring equal treatment. But future claimants will not
always be represented.
In Locks v. U.S. Trustee,88 Gene Locks, a lawyer for asbestos
claimants, attempted to have himself appointed as the FCR, a move
opposed by the debtor and creditors’ committee. The committee
represented prepetition asbestos claimants—those whose disease
had already manifested.89 The debtor was liquidating, and, since
there would be no business left to save from overhanging future
claims liability, the court was unwilling to recognize future

claimants as creditors, citing among other reasons the
administrative costs of maintaining a facility to pay future claims
and the minimal dividend they would receive. Future claims
received no distribution.90
In the Piper Aircraft case, future claimants were lucky. An FCR
was appointed at the behest of a prospective acquirer of the
debtor’s business.91 The debtor and creditors’ committee had
agreed that the business should be sold, but it seemed unlikely that
a buyer could be found unless future products liabilities of the
extant fleet were resolved in the bankruptcy and successor liability
risks eliminated. Formal representation of future claimants would
be necessary to bind them to any plan.92 Later in the case,
however, the debtor and committee decided that a buyer could be
found without addressing future claims liability.93 But by that
point, the FCR had already been appointed, and there was no way
to get rid of him! Future claimants would have to be accounted for
in the bankruptcy distribution.94
Even in reorganization, the judge may refuse to appoint an FCR. In
Dow Corning, for example, the future claimants were women with
allegedly defective breast implants manufactured by the debtor.
Alan B. Morrison, a noted public interest lawyer, tried to get
himself appointed as their FCR. His application was opposed by
the official tort claimants’ committee, which officially represented
all women with defective implants, regardless of whether they had
manifested health problems.95 The judge rejected the application.96
The judge agreed with the tort claimants’ committee that all
claimants were capable of coming forward and representing their
own interests, despite the fact that some potential claimants had
not manifested any injury from the implants.97
As an institution for the representation and protection of future
claimants, the FCR device is underinclusive. Its use suggests not so
much a concern for otherwise unrepresented claimants, but instead
a need to provide due process cover in order to bind future
claimants to a reorganization plan.
2.

Appointment of the FCR and the Commitment to Reorganize
Once application has been made for appointment of the FCR, then
it is up to the judge to decide whether to appoint. Presumably, the
judge will favor appointment if she agrees with the assessments of
the moving parties concerning the promise of reorganization and,
to that end, the necessity of resolving future claims liability.98

A consequence of this initial screening process by parties in
interest and the court is that they have all become invested in the
prospect of a successful reorganization. The decision to appoint an
FCR is an important milestone in committing to reorganization.99
The court and parties in interest effectively commit to the view that
the debtor’s business should be saved, and that future claimants are
entitled to a share of value in the reorganized entity. And tThese
commitments are more or less irrevocable. The FCR’s appointment
implicitly recognizes future claimants’ rights in the case, and once
appointed, the FCR cannot be decommissioned. The court and
parties in interest commit to including future claims in the
bankruptcy distribution, as well to the complex—and expensive—
mechanisms necessary for estimation, liquidation and payment of
those future claims. All of this overhead, along with the costs of
having an FCR at all, might be difficult to justify if no going
concern surplus were in the offing—that is, if the debtor’s business
were ultimately liquidated.100
This escalating commitment to reorganize affects the entire course
and conduct of the bankruptcy case. While a successful
reorganization is certainly a desirable outcome, how that outcome
is achieved also matters. This commitment to reorganize affects the
judge, the FCR, and other parties in interest in ways that may be
inimical to future claimants’ interests. While all parties stand to
benefit from a successful reorganization, future claimants’ inability
to select or monitor their agent disadvantages them in terms of the
ultimate division of value in reorganization.
With the power to decide whether and whom to appoint, the judge
will wish to select a "safe" FCR, one who subscribes to the
common goal of reorganization. The FCR, the judge, and other
parties in interest will understand this role for the FCR, and their
respective expectations of the FCR’s conduct will be affected
accordingly. The FCR’s latitude to champion future claimants’
cause may be circumscribed. She is not negotiating on a clean
slate, as she would be if her appointment did not depend on this
collective precommitment to reorganization.
The FCR may face pressure to compromise future claimants’
interests in subtle ways. Bankruptcy reorganization facilitates
collective action among claimants in order to preserve the debtor’s
going concern surplus, and the legal culture in large corporate
reorganization is one that ultimately values consensual resolution.
However, the division of the going concern surplus among
claimants depends to a great extent on claimants’ relative ability to
bluster and threaten to defect.101 The FCR may be singularly

handicapped in this poker game. Of all the bargaining agents, the
FCR has the widest discretion to settle and the least credible threat
to defect. The late House Speaker Sam Rayburn would advise new
members of Congress, "To get along, go along." The context of
large firm reorganization may give incentive for the FCR to do just
that.
In the next section, I discuss future claimants’ inability to monitor
their representative. I then discuss other influences that may be
brought to bear on the FCR in reorganization—namely, the
influences of the judge and other parties in interest.
B.

Reducing Agency Costs
Getting beyond the screening process for appointment of the FCR, a
wholly separate set of issues arise in those cases in which an FCR is
ultimately appointed. The agency costs of the FCR arrangement may be
quite high.
A principal may ordinarily reduce agency costs by affecting her agent’s
incentives, rewarding behavior consistent with the principal’s interests and
penalizing deviations. A principal may monitor performance of her agent,
intervening directly to penalize shirking or other undesirable behavior.
The principal and agent may also decide in advance that specific
benchmarks will be used to assess an agent’s performance ex post, with
rewards or penalties depending on such benchmarks. Player contracts in
professional sports, for example, routinely contain bonus contingencies for
exceptional performance based on objective measures.102
In lawyer-client relationships, unfortunately, clients often lack the
expertise to assess the quality of a lawyer’s advocacy or work product, or
even to question the lawyer’s bills.103 Monitoring may therefore not be
effective, and specifying objective ex post benchmarks for evaluation may
be infeasible. In the case of future claimants, they have all these
disabilities as clients and more. Even if they had the expertise to monitor
or evaluate their agent, they do not choose their agent or negotiate the fee
arrangement or participate at all.104 Therefore, they can neither set
incentives ex ante nor monitor ex post.105 They have no way to assure the
faithfulness of their agent.
Moreover, the quality of the FCR’s representation of future claimants will
realistically never be subjected to scrutiny by the ostensible principals.
Not only are the principals absent, but they are amorphous and scattered.
Many may not even discover their stake in the reorganization until
decades after its conclusion. Given the complexity of the mass tort
reorganization process and the lapse of time between the closing of the

case and the maturing of many of the future claims, it is unlikely that any
particular future claimant would have sufficient incentive to review—let
alone challenge—the FCR’s performance.106
Since future claimants are disabled from influencing the FCR’s agency, in
the way that typical principals would, that leaves open the question of
what other influences operate on the FCR and how they affect her
representation of future claimants. Given the absence of monitoring by the
FCR’s ostensible principals during the case and the FCR’s virtual
insulation from retrospective scrutiny, these other influences deserve
careful consideration.
C.

The Dominant Role of the Judge
Because future claimants are unavailable to decide whether to retain an
agent for themselves, select an agent, or arrange the terms of any agency,
those tasks fall to the judge. Once the judge has decided to appoint, it is up
to her to select the FCR and decide the terms of the appointment.
Typically, the U.S. Trustee recommends an individual, whom the court
approves after notice and hearing.109 While the judge may not necessarily
perform the initial screening, she has the final say over the FCR’s
appointment as well as the terms of that appointment. 108 She defines the
FCR’s powers and duties. In addition, the judge’s control over the purse—
that is, the judge’s power over professional fees109—and over the FCR’s
retention of professionals110 may have a significant effect on the FCR’s
ability to serve as the zealous advocate.
By contrast, other official appointments in bankruptcy are made by the
U.S. Trustee. In particular, the U.S. Trustee appoints the creditors’
committee in Chapter 11111, and the committee and debtor choose their
own attorneys and other professionals.112 This role for the U.S. Trustee
was created expressly for the purpose of removing the judge from the
administrative aspects of bankruptcy cases. Prior to the inception of the
U.S. Trustee program, judicial involvement with appointments and
supervision of appointees led to (i) appointees either feeling or appearing
beholden to judges,113 and (ii) judges developing feelings of personal
responsibility for the success or failure of their cases.114 Analogous
dangers may exist with judges’ involvement in the FCR appointment
process. Unlike members of creditors’ committees or their professionals,
the FCR is beholden to the judge for her appointment.115 And the judge
may also feel some proprietary interest in "her" FCR and the conduct of
the case.
Judicial control of the FCR is not an entirely objectionable practice, given
that the FCR, with no principal monitoring her actions, would otherwise

be unconstrained. But this practice of judicial supervision necessarily
requires us to consider the judge’s incentives.
1.

What Does the Judge Maximize?
Where does the judge’s self-interest lie? Even posing this question
might have seemed heretical in the not-too-distant past.:
"[C]riticizing judges for self-interested behavior . . . is considered
by many to be as profane as accusing the Pope of a lecherous eye,
a charge well-nigh outside the bounds of civilized discourse."116
Recent scholarship, however, has focused attention on judges as
utility maximizers, not necessarily immune to the pursuit of selfinterest.117
What does the judge seek to maximize in the mass tort case?118 To
answer this query, it is important to understand the relative novelty
of a mass tort case on any bankruptcy judge’s docket. It will
undoubtedly involve a large company. Outside of the Southern
District of New York and the District of Delaware,
"megabankruptcies" are not common affairs.119 A mass tort filing
is likely to be one of the largest—if not the largest—and most
widely followed bankruptcy case over which the judge has ever
presided. Especially given the mass harm involved, the case is
likely to attract significant public scrutiny.
Given the public and professional attention focused on the case,
the judge will have a reputational stake in the conduct and outcome
of the case. A well-managed case with a good outcome will
maximize the judge’s prestige and reputation. Therefore, the judge
will wish to appear competent—intelligent, an efficient case
manager. A perception of fairness may also be important. In terms
of outcome, the judge’s best hope is that the debtor successfully
reorganize, and that it do so on a consensual basis—that is, all
impaired classes vote in favor of the plan.120 A "successful"
outcome is one that saves the company. Many employees will keep
their jobs. The local community preserves its tax base. Existing
customer and supplier relationships with the debtor continue.
Going concern value is preserved. And fAnd future claimants are
promised compensation for their future injuries.
In the mass tort context, saving the going concern may be
especially beneficial in terms of reputational enhancement. The
cases are complex. The legal and logistical issues are daunting.
Moreover, having agreed to appoint the FCR in the first place, the
judge—as well as the parties in interest—have already escalated
their commitment to reorganization.121

2.

Expressing the Judge’s Preferences
How does the judge’s preference for reorganization affect the FCR
mechanism? Certainly, the process of appointing an FCR and
defining the terms of the appointment allow the judge an
opportunity to express her preferences. A judge—and certainly
parties in interest—might be less interested in finding a person to
provide zealous representation for future claimants than one who
understands the paramount goal of reorganization. The ideal
candidate may be one who will provide "adequate" representation,
understanding and subscribing to the ultimate aim of reorganizing
the debtor.122
In Robins, for instance, the court agreed to the appointment of a
FCR, but the judge chose a surprisingly junior person for the task,
given the size of the case and the caliber and experience of the
other lawyers involved.123 Stanley Joynes, the appointee, was a
young lawyer who apparently had no significant bankruptcy
experience at the time of his appointment.124 The court also refused
Mr. Joynes’ request to retain a bankruptcy expert in the case.
Joynes’ proposed expert, Professor Vern Countryman of Harvard,
was willing to work for a remarkably low hourly rate. The sum
total of Professor Countryman’s fees in the case would not likely
have exceeded $50,000, a pittance compared to the fees paid to the
lawyers and other professionals retained by the debtor and official
committees in the case.125 The court was apparently concerned
with duplication of effort and unnecessary expense!126
Appointment of an FCR, then, does not typically constitute a blank
check for the agent to fight the good fight on behalf of the
principal. In UNR, the court initially refused a request to appoint
an FCR.127 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit dismissed, finding that
the judge’s order was not a final order and therefore not ripe for
appeal.128 Judge Posner did suggest, however, that future claims
might properly be handled in bankruptcy.129 Upon a subsequent
motion to reconsider, the bankruptcy court agreed to the
appointment, ordering that the FCR’s "primary task" would be "to
advise putative asbestos disease victims of the pendency of and
their interest in these bankruptcy proceedings."130 In addition, the
FCR "may also be heard" with respect to any plan of
reorganization and any motion to convert the case. However, the
FCR was required to seek leave of the court to become involved in
any other litigation.131 In subsequent litigation, the court expressed
the view that defining the scope of the FCR’s powers and duties
was a matter of administration, as to which the court had final
decision-making authority. "This Court can alter or amend [the

FCR’s] powers and responsibilities as circumstances might
dictate."132
In addition to sticks, judges have carrots at their disposal with
respect to managing the FCR. In Johns-Manville, the first of the
mass tort bankruptcy cases, the judge ultimately awarded the FCR
a 100% premium over and above his fee for his billed hours.133
From future claimants’ perspective, however, the representation
was hardly ideal. The FCR, rather than a single-minded advocate
for future claimants interests, played instead the "honest broker"
among represented constituencies. While he successfully brokered
a consensual plan of reorganization in an enormously complex
case—presumably justifying his 100% bonus in the judge’s eyes—
future claimants fared quite badly in the resulting deal.134
Given this sort of judicial management, the FCR in the course of
her representation of future claimants must necessarily consider
not only what is best for future claimants, but also what the judge
wants. These two sets of interests may not always coincide.
In addition to the judge’s control over the selection of the FCR and
the terms of her agency, the judge has significant influence over
other aspects of the case that directly affect future claimants and
the prospects for reorganization. An estimation proceeding, for
instance, fixes the aggregate amount of future claims liability. By
fixing this number, the judge effectively sets an important
negotiating parameter. She decides how much future claimants are
"owed," and therefore resolves future claimants’ maximum
entitlement under the plan. A small number may be better than a
big number in terms of facilitating reorganization,135 since a high
estimate of future claims liability shrinks all other slices of the
reorganization pie. Competing claimants’ recoveries must
necessarily be reduced, the larger the share of value that belongs to
future claimants. However, creditors staring at quantifiable out-ofpocket losses may be less willing to take a "haircut"—a recovery
discounted from the face amount of their debt—than a FCR, whose
clients’ losses are not vivid.136 Indeed, the losses have not yet
occurred. They are prospective and somewhat conjectural. This is
not to suggest that a judge would consciously skew an estimate in
order to preserve value for current claimants. But the mere
potential for this may dampen the FCR’s enthusiasm for a fight.137
The judge’s preference for reorganization, then, combined with her
control of the terms of the FCR’s appointment and the case itself,
may curb the FCR’s enthusiasm for zealous advocacy for future
claimants’ interests. No direct order need by given by the judge.

The FCR may simply find it easier to go along. While there may be
countervailing considerations that give the FCR incentive to take
on the judge or other creditor groups, 138 the fear of client reprisal
is not an issue. The FCR has no client calling.
D.

Legal Culture and Group Norms
The judge is not the only influence affecting the FCR. The mass tort case
is a species of "megabankruptcy," and megabankruptcy has its own
culture. The FCR must operate within this culture, which values
consensual reorganization. In particular, lawyers in the large cases
understand that consensual reorganization is the responsible approach, and
that they may have to forego strict enforcement of their clients’ legal
entitlements in order to achieve consensus. In this culture, the FCR may be
peculiarly vulnerable to group pressure to compromise her clients’
interests.
The lawyers and other professionals who regularly appear as the key
players in the reorganization of large, publicly held companies form a
fairly small community.139 Members of this group can expect to be repeat
players in the large cases. As such, they have some incentive to cooperate
with each other.140 As with any culture, this group has shared
understandings—norms about how cases are conducted and disputes
resolved.141
Lynn LoPucki and Bill Whitford have noted the high incidence of
consensual plans in the large reorganizations—all impaired classes
ultimately approved the plan—and that distribution of value under such
plans almost invariably deviates from the absolute priority rule. In their
sample of cases, although debtors were clearly insolvent—and therefore
equity holders had no legal entitlement to any bankruptcy distribution—
senior classes nevertheless ultimately gave up value to equity holders.142
Lawyers interviewed asserted that consensual plans were the norm
because of the expense and delay of litigating nonconsensual "cram down"
plans. And the distributions to equity were the "price of peace."143
LoPucki and Whitford found, however, that the avoidance of litigation
costs could not explain the size of the distributions to equity, which were
worth significantly more than potential litigation costs.144 Cram down was
not necessarily undesirable from an economic standpoint. But it was "just
not done."
Although these cases were spread throughout the United States, most of
the lawyers who played key roles in them were members of the same legal
community. They could expect to be involved in future cases with their
current adversaries and were to various degrees dependent on those

adversaries for professional respect and advancement. They were not
entirely free to ignore the conventional wisdom that consensual plans were
the responsible, appropriate means for accomplishing reorganization and
that despite the absolute priority rule, everyone at the bargaining table was
entitled to a share.145
Social norms require that everyone at the bargaining table receive a share,
legal entitlements notwithstanding. In the large cases, lawyers expect
ultimately to settle. Moreover, they willingly compromise their clients’
legal entitlements when no clear legal or economic justification exists. If
lawyers with "real" clients will compromise in obeisance to group norms,
how much worse off will future claimants be with the FCR? From which
classes will the value come that is necessary to achieve consensus in the
mass tort bankruptcy? The most ready source is the class of future claims,
which are the most abstract and conceptual of legal entitlements. The
dollar amount of claims is a statistical and scientific construct. Moreover,
the clients themselves are somewhat abstract, at least at the time of the
bankruptcy.146
The division of value among claimants occurs over multiple negotiations
in the case. The fight over estimation, the design of the claims resolution
facility, and valuation of the consideration to be placed in trust for future
claimants, for example, all are issues that will affect the ultimate
bankruptcy distribution. Sometimes confrontation beats cooperation in
terms of serving the client’s best interest. Any lawyer unwilling to push, or
unable to mount a credible threat that it will push, is disadvantaged in the
negotiation.
The FCR may be peculiarly disadvantaged in her ability to bluster. Given
the group norm toward consensus—the "responsible" approach—the FCR
might be more readily ostracized by the group for disruptive hold-up
behavior than would other lawyers. All other players have clients to whom
they answer. Any recalcitrance on their part might be understandable. No
such countervailing consideration is available to the FCR. All bargaining
agents in Chapter 11 enjoy some degree of independence from their
constituents.147 None, however, is quite so free as the FCR.
Given the small community of lawyers involved in the large cases, the
FCR will have some stake in maintaining good standing with the group.
Professional reputation and opportunities for future work in the megacases
may turn to some extent on other group members’ opinion of the quality
of the FCR’s representation.
[L]awyers . . . had an incentive to be concerned not only with the welfare
of their clients but also with their relationships to each other. Lawyers who
act unconventionally in a particular case may find it difficult to negotiate

effectively in future cases with the other lawyers. Moreover, the other
lawyers are likely to form and express opinions about the quality of the
lawyer’s representation, and these opinions may influence whether the
lawyer obtains future clients. . . . Social norms typically are enforced by
ostracizing violators and these norms are no exception.148
Obstructionist tactics that violate group norms may lead to accusations
that the FCR was a "crazy" or "troublemaker."149 Lawyers with "real"
clients succumb to the pressure of the group norms. For the FCR,
subscribing to the group norms is likely costless.
IV.

Tentative Conclusions and Further Inquiries
The FCR device ought to be viewed with a degree of skepticism. The resultoriented nature of the FCR mechanism, the influence of the judge, and the legal
culture of the megabankruptcy—coupled with the absence of principals to
monitor the FCR’s behavior—together give cause for concern.
Have future claimants gotten good deals or raw deals in the mass tort
bankruptcies to date? Assessment of outcomes is not a straightforward task. First,
given the relative handful of cases, broad generalizations would be ill-advised;
only tentative assessments are appropriate. Second, there is the problem of
ascertaining the appropriate baseline for comparison. The evolution of the
traditional bankruptcy approach has occurred in the face of significant legal
uncertainty. While courts have upheld the various elements of the traditional
approach, some uncertainty still exists concerning (a) future claimants’ status as
creditors in bankruptcy, (b) bankruptcy courts’ power to estimate future claims
liability for distribution purposes, (c) bankruptcy’s ability to bind future claimants
to the terms of a confirmed plan and courts’ power to enjoin future lawsuits
against the reorganized debtor or its successors.150 Therefore, future claimants’
entitlement in bankruptcy has not always been clear. This is a separate problem
from the issues of effective representation raised by the FCR mechanism, but one
that has also affected future claimants’ treatment in bankruptcy.
The mass tort problem may well-nigh be intractable for courts and lawyers, who
have been left to craft prospective solutions—providing compensation systems for
harms that have not yet occurred—only because of legislative inaction. One might
credibly assert that saving the debtor and providing some compensation to future
tort victims at all should be considered a victory.
Moreover, the FCR mechanism may be the best of a whole host of imperfect
alternatives.151 Given an appropriate benchmark, empirical research may show
that the FCR mechanism has worked well on the whole. Despite the absence of
principals, other influences may exist that serve as adequate substitutes for actual
monitoring of the agent. Public scrutiny of future claimants’ fortunes in these
highly visible cases might provide a substitute for active monitoring of the FCR

by real principals. However, given the complexity of the proceedings—both legal
and scientific—public assessment of outcomes might be difficult. Assessment of
the performance of particular individuals would be even more problematic.152
Reputational concerns may exist that cause the interests of the FCR to align with
those of future claimants in maximizing recoveries to the latter. Or perhaps norms
of professional integrity and responsibility operate to constrain shirking or selfinterested behavior by the FCR. The prospect of repeat business as a FCR is
probably not very promising, given the rarity of mass tort filings. Moreover, given
judges’ incentives, an overly aggressive FCR from an earlier mass tort case may
not be an attractive candidate for a subsequent appointment. On the other hand,
competent and faithful representation of future claimants might plausibly
facilitate a reputation for professionalism and integrity, qualities that would be
useful in landing other representations. Stanley Joynes, for example, the young
and inexperienced lawyer picked to represent the Robins future claimants, served
future claimants "admirably."153 He was later retained by the official physicians’
committee in the Dow Corning case.154
To the extent external influences exist to align the interests of FCRs with future
claimants, these influences need explaining. If they do not currently exist, then
perhaps they could be manufactured. Perhaps a compensation arrangement for the
FCR could be designed to encourage her attention to future claimants’ ultimate
recoveries. That is, the FCR could be explicitly reconceptualized as an
entrepreneur—as well as an agent—and given some financial stake in maximizing
future claimants’ recoveries.155 This approach would require, among other things,
a bankruptcy judge willing to turn the FCR loose to advocate for her clients. Or,
given that the Chapter 11 culture creates pressure to compromise future
claimants’ interests, perhaps influences from outside this culture could be
imported. A federal agency with a strong consumer protection culture—the
Federal Trade Commission, for example—could be enlisted to participate in
reorganizations involving mass tort claims.156
In any event, a "traditional" approach to mass tort bankruptcy has emerged. It is
high time that the FCR mechanism, a central feature of this bankruptcy model,
receive careful consideration. This Article sketches some of the major issues, with
the hope and expectation of further scholarly and professional attention to the
subject.
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26. See Tung, supra note 8, at 1694 & n.52.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1994).
28. Id. §§ 1121, 1112.
29. "The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for
which they are designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977) [hereinafter, House Report].
30. Roger Fischer and Bill Ury refer to this consideration as "BATNA," the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement. See Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes (1992).
31. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 477 (3d ed. 1996).
32. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 138 (1990).
33. Id. at 178. Deviations from strict absolute priority, however, are generally small in percentage terms.
See id.
34. Johns-Manville, for example, was profitable when it filed for bankruptcy, and its financial picture
actually improved during the first few years of bankruptcy. See The Journal Record, Aug. 3, 1985.
35. In some cases, the harm-generating potential was known to the manufacturer long before it became
apparent to the public. See Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (1985)
(claiming that executives of Johns-Manville and other asbestos producers actively suppressed evidence of
harmful effects of exposure); Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The Story of the Dalkon Shield
Bankruptcy 1-22 (1991) (chronicling A.H. Robins’ history of ignoring safety research showing dangers
associated with use of Dalkon Shield); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773, 823-24 (1997) (describing concealment of adverse safety testing results
in marketing of breast implants and tobacco, as well as asbestos and Dalkon Shield).
36. See Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion Dollar Crisis, 30 Harvard J.
on Legis. 383, 387-88 (1993). In addition to toxic torts, products liability may also give rise to long-tail
mass tort problems. A product may remain in circulation for quite some time, for example, before causing
harm. At the time of the Piper Aircraft bankruptcy, an estimated 95,000 Piper planes were still in existence
worldwide, and the average age of a Piper aircraft still flying was 24 years. Amended Disclosure Statement
Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code with Respect to the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan

of Reorganization of the Debtor, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Piper Aircraft
Corporation, Newco Pac, Inc., Teledyne Indus., Inc. and Dimeling, Schreiber and Park, dated May 19, 1995
(In re Piper Aircraft Corp.) (No. 91-31884-BKC-RAM) at 12-13 [hereinafter Piper Disclosure Statement].
See also In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92, 100 (Del. Ch. 1992) (noting actuarial forecasts that future claims
involving industrial valve products would arise for 20 to 30 years following dissolution); Polius v. Clark
Equip., 802 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986) (involving 1983 accident with machine manufactured in 1969);
Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. 1981) (involving 1972 accident with machine
manufactured in 1957); Mark R. Sarlitto, Note, Recognizing Products Liability Claims at Dissolution: The
Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1048 (1987):
Insurance industry statistics. . . suggest that only thirty percent of expected general
liability claims (which include products liability) are reported three years after the initial
policy year and only sixty percent are reported after the eighth year. Not until thirteen
years after the initial policy year are seventy-five percent of the losses known to the
insurer. The balance of these losses develop over the next two decades.
Id. at 1052 (citing Reinsurance Ass’n of America, Loss Development Study: 1985 Edition 5 (1985)).
37. While a factory explosion that injures many could also reasonably be described as a "mass" tort, that
situation does not present the same difficulties involving contingent liabilities as the asbestos cases or other
future claims cases. My focus in this Article is on these latter types of cases, and I use the term "mass tort"
in that sense.
38. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 856-62 (1984) [hereinafter Roe,
Mass Tort] (describing slow process of operational collapse for company beset by mass future tort
liabilities which inhibit its access to capital markets).
39. In addition, upon the debtor’s collapse, the only possible source of future compensation to future
claimants disappears. As the UNR court described:
The debtors allege what will occur if the court denies their Application [for appointment
of a FCR]: The 17,000 claims which already have been brought will be followed by
between 30,000 and 120,000 more over the next forty years. No lenders will extend credit
to companies burdened by litigation costs exceeding $1 million per month, with exposure
to damages in the incalculable millions of dollars. If the putative claims cannot be dealt
with in a reorganization, the debtors will have no choice but to liquidate. Whatever hope
the putative claimants have to a future recovery would vanish, because by the time their
diseases are discovered, there will be no company left with any assets to satisfy a
judgment.
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 741, 743-44 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Theoretically, even in a liquidation, value
could be set aside to compensate future claimants. However, this almost never happens, since no
represented party has any interest in paying future claims if the debtor is liquidating. See infra Part III.A.1.
40. Several general aviation aircraft manufacturers have also filed for bankruptcy. See Fairchild Aircraft
Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tx. 1995), vacated, 220 B.R.
909 (Bankr. W.D. Tx. 1998); Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft
Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). Whether tort liability was the precipitating cause of their demise is
unclear. However, blaming tort liability, these companies succeeded in obtaining passage of the General
Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40,101 (1994), a statute of repose that prohibits certain
products liability suits against manufacturers for accidents involving aircraft more than 18 years old. See
Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 435, 471 nn.142 & 143 (1999) [hereinafter, Tung, Future Claims] (describing
statute). However, at least in the bankruptcy of Piper Aircraft, poor management was apparently at least as

significant a cause of the company’s demise as its contingent tort liability. See Piper Disclosure Statement,
supra note 36, at 11-12 (describing "devastating consequences" of key business decisions of prepetition
management).
41. Courts have struggled over the preliminary question whether future claimants qualify as "creditors"
holding "claims" that may be addressed in bankruptcy. See Tung, Future Claims, supra note 40, at 466.
Commentators, however, generally agree that future claims may be included as bankruptcy "claims" and
dealt with in bankruptcy, id. at 457 n.86, and it seems unlikely that a bankruptcy court would refuse to treat
future claims in bankruptcy if other parties felt it necessary to saving the business.
42. With products liability, the universe of future victims may be impossible to capture except in general
terms. For example, the universe of potential future victims of plane crashes includes not only owners—
whose identities will change over time in any event—but also potential passengers and innocents with no
relation whatsoever to the owner of the plane. No one can identify in advance the house upon which the
plane will ultimately crash or the occupants of the house at the time.
With some toxic torts, it might be easier to identify all potential future victims. Users of Dalkon Shields or
breast implants, for example, could be identified through medical records. This would not apply, of course,
for a toxic substance like asbestos that does not require medical insertion into the human body.
43. In the context of mass tort settlement class actions, Susan Koniak contrasts "unknown" future
claimants—those who would realize they were future claimants if they received notice, but cannot be given
notice because they are unidentified—with unknowing future claimants—those for whom receipt of notice
would not be useful because they had not manifested any injury and might not realize they had been
exposed.
[H]ow does one provide notice and the opportunity to opt out to the unknowing? It
cannot be done, if notice means apprising those people that an action is pending that
affects them. By definition, unknowing persons have not manifested any injury and may
be unsure whether they have been exposed to the product. Therefore, those class
members cannot know in any meaningful sense that they are members of the class.
See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L.
Rev. 1045, 1086-87 (1995).
44. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997). See also Sobol, supra note 35, at 107-15
(describing debate over whether notice to future claimants concerning claims bar date in bankruptcy could
ever be adequate, given that future claimant in perfect health at time of notice would likely fail to
appreciate its significance and would not likely file proof of claim).
45. For instance, the Manville Trust, set up to manage assets for payment to asbestos claimants of JohnsManville, initially received 80% of the equity of the reorganized debtor and $869 million in cash and
receivables. See Findley v. Falise (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 473,
484 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996), on remand, 929 F.
Supp. 1 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996). Even that turned out to be insufficient. Id.
46. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 600 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (describing "traditional"
model and noting its failures).
47. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 941, 944
(1995). "The evolutionist emphasis draws attention to, and treats in a more consistent fashion, three distinct
but related features of mass torts litigation: (1) incremental system-building, (2) common-law process, and
(3) selection by judges and other policymakers among competing institutional designs." Id.

48. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (appointing representative
for asbestos-exposed future claimants, who are parties in interest); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d
Cir. 1985) (same). Some courts, however, refused to appoint FCRs. See infra Part III.A.1.
49. See, e.g., In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 189 B.R. 681 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (estimating both
prepetition and future asbestos claims for distribution purposes). See also Dow Corning, 211 B.R. 545
(discussing merits of competing estimation proposals). In Dow Corning, the court refused to adopt an
estimation process from among those presented by the parties, suggesting instead that the parties reach a
consensual resolution. Id.
While the Code specifically contemplates court estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims, estimation
is specifically authorized only for purposes of allowance, see 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1994), and voting. See
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3018(a) (court may temporarily allow claim "in an amount which the court deems proper"
for voting purposes). Claim allowance determines which claims may validly participate in the case. Only
claims that are "allowed" are entitled to vote on the terms of reorganization, see 11 U.S.C. § 1126, and
receive distributions. Id. § 726.
Estimation for purposes of distribution is not specifically authorized in the Code or the Bankruptcy Rules.
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission has recommended statutory amendments clarifying that
courts may estimate claims for purposes of distribution in mass future claims cases. See 1 Report of the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission 341 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC Report].
50. See, e.g., In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville), 982 F.2d 721 (2d
Cir. 1992) (describing plight of Manville Trust), modified, 993 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). See generally Roe,
Mass Tort, supra note 38, at 864 (describing payment devices to manage uncertainty regarding aggregate
claims liability).
51. In Piper, the claim resolution process included mandatory pre-trial mediation, as well as a binding
arbitration alternative to litigation. See Piper Disclosure Statement, supra note 36, at 138-39. In Robins, the
Claims Resolution Facility offers several different claim processing options, ranging from a "short form,"
which pays the electing claimant a nominal amount upon a minimal showing of Dalkon Shield use and
injury, to a fairly elaborate settlement process involving in-depth review of the claim, including the electing
claimant’s medical records. Should the process fail to produce a settlement, the claimant may resort to
binding arbitration or trial. See Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section
1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, March 28, 1988 (In re A.H. Robins Co.) (No. 85-01307-R), at CRF 1-9. See
generally Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities,
53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 113 (1990) (comparing differing features and objectives of several claims
resolution facilities).
52. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 625 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
bankruptcy court has equitable power to issue channeling injunction), aff’d sub nom., Kane v. JohnsManville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988)
(enjoining suit against successor corporation, among others), aff’d sub nom., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In
re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); Piper Disclosure Statement, supra note 36, at 112
(describing channeling injunction). Piper involved an asset sale. Manville was internally reorganized, and
the channeling injunction was used to insulate the reorganized debtor and others from suit by future
claimants. Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 624. In Robins, the debtor was merged into another entity as part of
the plan. That surviving entity and others were the beneficiaries of the channeling injunction. A.H. Robins,
88 B.R. at 751.
53. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). See generally Mabey &
Zisser, supra note 6.
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (1994).

55. Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i).
56. Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
57. See NBRC Report, supra note 49, at 315-50. Unlike the Manville Amendments, the NBRC Report does
not insist on the use of a trust device to hold assets on behalf of future claimants. It opts instead for more
flexibility, noting for example that insurance may provide a superior method of assuring compensation. Id.
at 346-47.
58. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 602 (discussing difficulties of accurately estimating mass
tort liability). See generally Salsburg & Williams, supra note 4.
59. See Findley v. Falise (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp. 473 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996), on remand, 929 F. Supp. 1 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
60. See Findley, 878 F. Supp at 484.
61. Id. at 493.
62. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dists. Asbestos Litig.), 129 B.R. 710, 755 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993). It was further
assumed that the timing of required claim payments would roughly coincide with the timing of the trust’s
cash inflows. See Findley, 129 B.R. at 755.
63. Id.
64. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A. H. Robins, Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied., 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1994).
66. Or at least the estimation will set the baseline from which negotiation over distributions begins. See
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
67. In re Dow Corning, 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
68. Id. at 602 ("It is our fervent hope that the parties achieve a fair distribution through settlement or mutual
agreement upon a process for resolving the case.").
69. See generally Sobol, supra note 35 , at 165-97 (describing complex wrangling among multiple parties
concerning conduct of estimation process).
70. See generally Peterson, supra note 51 (comparing differing features and objectives of several claims
resolution facilities).
71. See Sobol, supra note 35, at 155.
72. Id.
73. Of course, only in hindsight may that "last day" be determined.

74. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 88 B.R. 742, 752 (E.D. Va. 1988). See also Sobol, supra note 35, at 287
(describing judge’s control of Dalkon Shield Claimants’ Trust).
75. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
76. As to the actual selection of the FCR, the judge typically acts on a nomination by the U.S. Trustee. See
infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
78. Even if the client had the necessary skills to represent herself, she might have difficulty making
dispassionate judgments given her self-interest in the matter. She would risk being the proverbial "fool for
a client."
79. There may be some situations in which a future claimant’s perceived interest in the bankruptcy might
be immediate enough that she could reasonably be expected to act in her own behalf—either by retaining
her own lawyer or appearing pro se. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
80. See supra Part II.C.1.
81. Similar issues may arise when a court appoints a guardian to represent an infant or incompetent person.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). However, the FCR device may be unique in terms of the sheer number of
principals to be represented who are unable to oversee their agent, and the principals’ enormous aggregate
stake in the proceeding.
82. If the business could survive without comprehensive settlement of future claims, then perhaps future
claimants would be better off being left out. Each future claimant would then be free to sue the reorganized
debtor for a full recovery when her claim matured, instead of being relegated to the pro rata recovery that
might result from a bankruptcy settlement. See generally Tung, Future Claims, supra note 40, at 472.
83. This suggests that serious conflicts may exist among mass tort future claimants inter se. Early maturing
claimants may wish to be excluded from any collective settlement, leaving them free to pursue the
reorganized debtor.
84. Even if the problem of identifying future claimants can be overcome, see supra note 80 and
accompanying text, the costs of individual participation might discourage future claimants from becoming
involved. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
85. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1991)
(noting that the class action is "a tool for overcoming the free-rider and other collective action problems
that impair any attempt to organize a large number of discrete individuals into any common project").
86. For a detailed analysis of creditors’ calculus with respect to asset disposition alternatives, see Tung,
supra note 40, at 473.
87. See NBRC Report, supra note 49, at 321 ("[M]ass future claimants of a debtor liquidating in Chapter 7.
. . should be entitled to equal priority with present claimants."). True, some future claimants might be better
off left out of bankruptcy. But many will be made worse off, in large measure because the decision whether
or not they should be included is not randomly made. This decision is made by those with interests in direct
conflict with the interests of future claimants. See generally Tung, Future Claims, supra note 49, at 458
(describing alternative outcomes for future claimants when their rights are ignored in bankruptcy).

88. 157 B.R. 89 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
89. Id. at 90.
90. Id. at 99. Locks also happened to be a member of the creditors’ committee. Id. at 90. For that reason,
the court found that Mr. Locks was not the proper party to bring the motion, since he had an inherent
conflict. His fiduciary duty to the committee and the class of claimants it represented disqualified Mr.
Locks from advocating on behalf of future claimants, whose interests were adverse to those of current
claimants. Id. at 93.
One court was willing to appoint a FCR despite the fact that the debtor was liquidating. See In re FortyEight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). "[I]t would be highly inequitable to distribute
the liquidated assets of the debtor to the currently known plaintiffs to the detriment of the potential
claimants merely because the potential claimants have not yet manifested an injury." Id. at 477. That
liquidation, however, was unusual insofar as it was planned to be a "slow" liquidation over a 10-year
period. See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d 1294, 1297 (7th Cir. 1997).
91. The prospective purchaser, Pilatus Aircraft Limited, had signed a letter of intent with the debtor. The
letter of intent included a requirement that the debtor seek appointment of a future claims representative so
that future claims could be paid off and disposed of. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 621 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d as modified, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
92. See Piper, 162 B.R. at 622 n.3.
93. That is, an acquirer would be willing to purchase the business and assume the risk of post-bankruptcy
successor liability suits as future claims matured.
94. When the FCR, Professor David Epstein, filed a proof of claim attempting to define a broad class of
future claimants and setting the aggregate amount of their claims at $100 million, the debtor and committee
objected. The judge agreed with the debtor and the committee that Epstein’s proposed class was too broad.
See Piper, 162 B.R. 619. Ultimately, the issue was settled with a little help from Congress. See Tung,
Future Claims, supra note 40, at 471.
95. The committee took the position that all implant recipients had already suffered injury by virtue of
having received implants, and therefore that they were all current—and not future—claimants. Id.
96. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Motion of Alan B. Morrison for Appointment as the Legal Representative
of Future Breast Implant Claimants, In re Dow Corning Corp., No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct 10,
1995), which is discussed in In re Dow Corning, 211 B.R. 545, 598 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
97. The court differentiated the breast implant controversy from future asbestos disease victims and future
airplane crash victims on the ground that all breast implant recipients could self-identify and file their own
individual proofs of claim. Id.
98. If the judge agrees to make the appointment, she will typically solicit a nomination from the U.S.
Trustee, approve a nomination, and define the terms of the appointment. See infra Part III.C.
99. Some have suggested that a judicial bias exists toward reorganization generally. See Thomas H.
Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 220-21 (1986) (discussing bias of bankruptcy judges in
favor of reorganization); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,
1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (discussing Chapter 11 reorganization bias).

100. One foundational concept in social psychology is the phenomenon of escalating commitment. Once a
decision maker commits to an idea or a course of action, she has invested in it and will persist with it, even
in the face of information that tends to call into question the wisdom of the prior decision. She will reject
such information, while paying more attention to information tending to affirm her decision. See Barry M.
Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 577 (1981). In the
business context, organizational behaviorists have shown that managers will often make investment
decisions in a manner that justifies previous choices, irrespective of expected outcomes. Therefore,
managers will have a tendency to escalate their commitment to a course of action even if it is not costeffective. Id.
101. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 32, at 161 (noting strong correlation between "aggressive
representation" and success in garnering legally "undeserved" distributions for equity).
102. See Daniel M. Faber, The Evolution of Techniques for Negotiation of Sports Employment Contracts in
the Era of the Agent, 10 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 165, 189 (1993) (discussing incentive clauses);
Martin J. Greenberg, Drafting of Player Contracts & Clauses, 4 Marq. Sports L.J. 51, 57 (1993) (same).
103. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest
Regulation, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 970 (1997) (noting informational asymmetry between lawyer and client
concerning quality of lawyering).
104. As with the other lawyers and professionals compensated by the estate, the FCR is generally
compensated on an hourly basis.
105. Because at the time of the bankruptcy case, each future claimant’s individual stake in the outcome of
the case is likely to be quite small, no future claimant has sufficient incentive to monitor the FCR or the
proceeding.
106. Susan Koniak and George Cohen propose in the class action context that class counsel be subject to
malpractice suit by class members in the same way that clients may sue their lawyers in individualized
situations. Koniak and Cohen argue that court approval of class settlements should not insulate class
counsel from these suits, which would provide a much-needed deterrent to class counsels’ shirking or
selling out their clients. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 Va. L.
Rev. 1051 (1996). In the mass tort bankruptcy context, the disciplining effect of potential suits against the
FCR is doubtful for the reasons described in the text.
107. See In re UNR, 71 B.R. 467, 477 n.24 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203
B.R. 256, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
108. See Piper Disclosure Statement, supra note 36, at 26 (recounting debtor’s motion for appointment of a
FCR and court’s subsequent order appointing David Epstein to the position). In Forty-Eight Insulations, the
court left selection of the FCR to the agreement of the U.S. Trustee, the debtor and an official committee
representing asbestos-related claimants. Absent agreement, the court would select from among their
respective nominees. See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476, 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
109. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 328, 330, 331 (1994).
110. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994). There is some controversy over whether a judge has the authority
to reconstitute an official committee after it has been appointed. See In re Dow Corning Corp, 212 B.R. 258
(E.D. Mich. 1997) (describing controversy and ultimately holding that bankruptcy judge did not have
authority to remove attorneys from official tort claimants’ committee sua sponte). See also Kenneth N.

Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. Rev.
995, 1032 (1993) (discussing uncertain rules concerning altering of composition of committees).
The U.S. Trustee also appoints trustees in Chapter 7 liquidations. See 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1994). Creditor
election is available for selection of Chapter 7 trustees. Id. § 702. However, very often the few dollars at
stake for unsecured creditors in a liquidation do not justify their active monitoring of or participation in the
case. Because creditors show no interest in electing the trustee, the U.S. Trustee’s "interim" appointment
ordinarily remains the trustee for the entire Chapter 7 case. Id. § 701.
112. Id. §§ 327(a), 1103(a). The debtor’s lawyers and other professionals must be "disinterested" and must
not "hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate." Id. § 327(a). Likewise, committee professionals
must not represent "any other entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case." Id. § 1103(b).
113. House Report, supra note 29, at 89-91.
114. As the administrator of bankruptcy cases, and the individual responsible for the
supervision of the trustee or debtor in possession, it is an easy matter for a bankruptcy
judge to feel personally responsible for the success or failure of a case. Bankruptcy
judges frequently view a case as "my case." The institutional bias thus generated
magnifies the likelihood of unfair decisions in the bankruptcy court, and has caused at
least one occasional bankruptcy practitioner to suggest that "the bankruptcy court is the
only court I appear in in which the judge is an interested party."
Id. at 90.
115. Moreover, the notice and hearing that precedes the FCR’s approval by the court allows other parties in
interest to voice objections to the FCR nominee. No other official appointee or professional comes under
similar scrutiny by parties adverse to the interests of those meant to be represented.
116. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 106, at 1126 (describing judicial bias in favor of settlement in class
action context).
117. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993); Koniak & Cohen, supra note 106.
118. It may be a bankruptcy judge or district court judge or both. Bankruptcy jurisdiction is vested
originally with the district courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b) (1994), and the bankruptcy courts are
adjuncts of the district courts. Id. § 157(a). While most bankruptcy cases are automatically referred to the
bankruptcy court for the district in which the case is filed, in several mass tort bankruptcies, a district judge
has used the power of referral to craft a sort of power sharing arrangement with the bankruptcy judge,
pursuant to which both judges preside over the case. See Sixth Amended and Restated Disclosure
Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code, March 28, 1988 (In re A.H. Robins Co.) (No.
85-01307-R), at 18. Besides the prestige and public attention that comes from presiding over a mass tort
bankruptcy, there may be a sound legal reason for the district judge to maintain close involvement with the
case. Under the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, it is unclear whether a bankruptcy court may estimate or
liquidate contingent personal injury tort claims for purposes of distribution in bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(B) (1994).
I refer in the text to the bankruptcy judge. However, the description applies equally well to a district court
judge presiding over a mass tort case.
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